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Abstract: An asset possessed by a defender grows from the first to the second 
period and is attacked in both periods. With large growth, there is no attack in 
the first period. Conflict is eliminated. The attacker postpones the attack until 
the second period. The attacker shows restraint in the first period in order to 
cash in on the fruits of her restraint in the second period. When the defender’s 
discount parameter is at least 1/8 of the attacker’s discount parameter, the 
defender’s first period investment is inverse U formed in growth and eventually 
decreases to zero since with more growth, he eventually has to defend against a 
greater attack in the second period. In the second period, both actors’ 
investments increase in growth. The defender’s discount parameter does not 
influence whether an attack occurs in the first period. A first period attack is 
prevented if the attacker’s discount parameter is large, and growth is above a 
certain value. Also, if the product of growth and the attacker’s discount 
parameter is above one, a first period attack is prevented if the defence 
inefficiency is large, or the attack inefficiency is low, or the usability of 
appropriation is large. 
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1 Introduction 
This article analyses when to attack an asset that grows over time. The asset possessed by 
the defender is valuable to both agents. If the attacker appropriates the asset today, it 
cannot grow into the future, so the attacker may decide to farm the defender and attack 
the asset in the future. Dynamic conflict theory poses, as Hirshleifer (1995, p.31) points 
out, a ‘fearful analytical problem’. Static conflict theory is well researched but needs to 
be supplemented with the time dimension which is essential in all conflict.1 This article 
succeeds in making one new breakthrough in the dynamics of conflict. A defender is 
equipped with an asset. An attacker can choose to attack the asset in the first period, or 
the second period, or in both periods. The asset grows from the first to the second period, 
and the defender chooses the optimal defence in both periods. Results are generated 
dependent on the growth rate, different discount parameters for the defender and attacker, 
the defence inefficiency, the attack inefficiency, and a usability parameter for the 
attacker. A conventional static analysis considers the tradeoffs each actor makes between 
how much to invest to defend or attack the asset at a given point in time, dependent on 
the opponent’s investment. This article additionally analyses the tradeoffs each actor 
makes concerning investments through time. Each actor’s investment in each time period 
accounts for the same actor’s investment in the other time period, and for the other 
actor’s investments in both periods. The tradeoffs are crucially different for the defender 
and attacker in the two periods, and depend on the six parameters in sometimes 
unexpected ways. 
A few contributions in the literature have focused on the dynamics of conflict. Sethi 
(1979) applies simple intertemporal optimisation, without strategic interaction, to analyse 
a continuous dynamic pilfering thief. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001) consider two rival 
groups, each dependent on a single contested renewable resource. They develop 
differential equations where, at each point in time, groups allocate their members 
between resource harvesting and resource appropriation to maximise their income. This 
leads to a complex non-linear dynamic interaction between conflict, the two populations, 
and the resource. Hausken (2005a) generalises the model to account for the within-group 
collective action problem, different resource stocks and efficiencies of harvesting for the 
two groups, and variable decisiveness of fighting between the two groups. Maxwell and 
Reuveny (2005) further investigate continuous conflict over renewable natural resources. 
They find that Hirshleifer’s (1991) ‘paradox of power’ is self-correcting, and that if 
production causes damage to disputed resources, introducing conflict enhances social 
welfare. Related to war, Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006) consider commitment and 
conflicts resulting from bargaining over issues that affect future bargaining power. The 
literature on economic growth has to a limited degree focused on conflict, and instead on 
income distribution, human capital, fertility, trade development, money, etc. One 
example is Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) who analyse how the level of wealth and the 
degree of inequality affects growth. 
For game theory more generally, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) have shown that “any 
individually rational outcome can arise as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games 
with sufficiently little discounting.”2 Their result has often been used to show that 
cooperation rather than conflict can be sustained in long-term relationships. The 
prisoner’s dilemma has often been used for illustration (Axelrod, 1984). For the battle of 
the sexes where one player values the future while the other is myopic, Hausken (2005b) 
shows that the first player is more inclined through conflictful behaviour to risk a conflict 
in the present when the future is important. Similarly, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) 
and Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) show how increased importance of the future may 
harm cooperation. Skaperdas and Syropoulos’ (1996) model is such that victory in one 
period puts one at an advantage in future-period conflicts. This gives growth in the 
contestable good regardless who holds it, and hence growth intensifies conflict. Lee and 
Skaperdas (1998) and Gonzalez (2005) attempt to analyse how conflict affects growth 
and how this feeds back into conflict. These mixed results on the literature make it quite 
appropriate to analyse whether a two period growth model suppresses or amplifies 
conflict, possibly differently in the two periods. Whether growth deters or encourages 
appropriation is a challenging issue which needs to be analysed thoroughly. This article 
provides a more nuanced view of how growth impacts conflict. 
The attacker’s decision in an intertemporal conflict model can also be conceptualised 
as how to make investment substitutions across time. A large attack in the first period is 
detrimental to asset growth and reduces the opportunities in the second period. 
Conversely, a too modest attack in the first period may also be suboptimal since the 
attacker’s first period profit may get too low. Such substitutions have hardly been 
analysed in the literature, though there are a few cases with a somewhat different focus. 
First, Enders and Sandler (2003) suggest that a terrorist may compile and accumulate 
resources during times when the defender’s investments are high, awaiting times when 
the defender may relax his efforts and choose lower investments. Second, in preventing 
terrorism, Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003, pp.201, 224) show that ‘the optimal control of 
terror stocks will rely on both ongoing abatement and periodic cleanup’ of ‘a terrorist’s 
‘stock of terror capacity’’. Their work is influenced by Arrow et al.’s (1951) and Scarf’s 
(1960) (S,s) model of inventory management. The optimal policy in the face of stochastic 
demand for a product is to replenish inventory up to a level given by S every time it falls 
to or below s. These contributions do not consider a strategic opponent. 
Section 2 develops the two-period game. Section 3 solves the game. Section 4 
discusses the conditions for neither attack nor defence in the first period. Section 5 
presents simulations. Section 6 concludes. 
2 A two-period game 
Consider a firm, or more generally any collective or individual actor, with an asset r 
which it seeks to defend. The asset may be anything of value such as the firm itself, its 
possessions, a physical or non-physical commodity, an information set, etc. The firm is 
under attack by another actor which seeks to acquire the asset, or a largest possible 
fraction of it. The other actor may be another firm in the same or in another industry, or 
more generally any collective or individual actor which lawfully or unlawfully seeks to 
appropriate the asset, or earns profit from destroying it. The attacker’s objective may be 
financial gain, or it may be a desire to cause maximum destruction through time for 
example if the attacker is a terrorist. Other possible objectives for the attacker are 
political gain, leisure activities, or a desire for challenges. Whether or not this other actor 
has assets is not under consideration in this paper. In period i, i = 1, 2, the firm, referred 
to as the defender, incurs an effort ti to defend his asset, hereafter referred to as an 
investment. The effort may be hiring competent personnel such as lawyers, engineers, 
and security guards, or implementation of procedures to protect the asset while ensuring 
that it is available and accessible as the defender requires, or investment in technology 
such as physical barriers, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems, encryption 
techniques, access control mechanisms, to ascertain that the defence is optimal. The 
defence investment expenditure is fi, where / 0.i if t∂ ∂ >  We consider the simple case 
fi = bti, where b is the inefficiency of investment. Higher b means greater inefficiency, 
and 1/b is the efficiency.3 
Independently and simultaneously in period i, the other actor, referred to as the 
attacker, incurs an effort Ti to acquire the asset. The attacker seeks to be more competent 
than the lawyers, engineers, and security guards employed by the defender, seeks to 
circumvent the defence procedures, and seeks to break through the firewalls, penetrate 
the intrusion detection systems, encryption techniques, and access control mechanisms, 
thus attempting to design the optimal attack. Analogously, the attack investment 
expenditure is Fi, / 0.i iF T∂ ∂ >  We assume Fi = BTi, where B is the inefficiency of 
investment, and 1/B is the efficiency. Both the expenditures bti and BTi can be capital 
and/or labour, and both the defender and attacker are assumed risk neutral.4 
We assume that the contest between the defender and attacker takes the form that is 
common in the conflict and rent seeking literature (Hirshleifer, 1995; Skaperdas, 1996). 
The defender gets a fraction hi, and the attacker gets the remaining fraction 1-hi, where hi 
is the contest success function, / 0, / 0.i i i ih t h T∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ <  The fraction hi can be thought 
of as an actual value, or an expected value. We use the common ratio formula (Tullock, 
1980): 
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The defender’s and attacker’s profits in period i are ui and Ui, respectively. Based on the 
reasoning above, the profits in the first period are: 
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where β, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, is a usability or non-destruction parameter. It expresses that fraction 
of the appropriated asset that the attacker can make use of. The appropriator gains a 
fraction β of what the defender loses. Very few appropriations are like transfers of, say, 
$1 million, from a defender to an attacker. As Grossman and Kim (1995, p.1279) point 
out, predation may involve violence and destruction, may have to be processed to be 
usable, or may be subject to deterioration during shipment. Further, if an information 
asset is appropriated, the attacker may not fully understand or appreciate the content. 
More generally, the cost of adapting an appropriated asset to one’s overall portfolio of 
assets, an attacker generally attach different subjective utilities to assets appropriated 
from others compared with assets it possesses or produces itself. 
After the contest in the first period the defender retains the smaller asset rt1 / (t1 + T1). 
Defenders are continuously worn down by attackers, especially if attackers are 
successful, and are often also worn down by the wear and tear of time. With nothing to 
counteract this wearing down, the assets of defenders would gradually become smaller 
and smaller, and eventually disappear. Usually, defenders of assets set in motion 
processes to ensure that assets grow over time. Such growth may be due to a blossoming 
economy, discovering and exploiting market opportunities, hard and skillful work, 
outside funding, or the benefit of being at the right place at the right time. If an asset is 
converted into money and placed in a bank, the asset earns an interest rate. If the asset is 
invested in the stock market, dividends may be paid out. Workers and consultants can be 
employed to grow assets, and contracts with various actors can be made to ensure further 
growth. Assets may grow in many different ways from one period to the next. The most 
straightforward method is to multiply with a growth parameter a, which corresponds to a 
geometric series. Another method is to raise the asset to an exponent h. Applying both 
these two methods, assume that the defender’s asset rt1 / (t1 + T1) after the first period 
grows to art1 / (t1 + T1) at the start of the second period. If a = 1, there is no growth from 
the first to the second period. The defender simply starts the second period with the same 
asset it retained after the first period. If a > 1, there is positive growth. If 0 < a < 1 the 
asset deteriorates which means negative growth. Finally, if a = 0, the asset vanishes, the 
defender is driven out of business, and the second period is not worth playing. The 
fraction rT1 / (t1 + T1) of the asset acquired by the attacker in the first period is not subject 
to growth. It is simply consumed by the attacker. 
In the second period the actors invest analogously as in the first period. Independently 
and simultaneously, the defender incurs an effort t2 and the attacker incurs an effort T2. 
Based on the reasoning above, the profits in the second period are: 
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Note that the term art1 / (t1 + T1) is present in both u2 and U2 since this is what is under 
attack in the second period, and that β is present (only once) in U2 to express destruction 
also in the second period. 
For the two-period game as a whole, with discounting 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 for the defender and 
0 ≤ Δ ≤ 1 for the attacker for the second period, the total profits u and U for the defender 
and attacker are: 
1 2 1 2,u u u U U U= + = + Δδ (4)
3 Solving the two-period game 
The game is solved with backward induction, starting with the second period, assuming a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. We thereafter find the optimal solution in the first period, 
taking into account that the actors’ choices in the second period must be in equilibrium. 
Differentiating (3), and solving the first order conditions 2 2/ 0u t∂ ∂ =  and 2 2/ 0U T∂ ∂ =  
gives 
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Intuitively, the ratio t2/T2 of the investments in the second period is inverse proportional 
to the ratio b/B of the inefficiencies, and inverse proportional to the usability β for the 
attacker. Inserting (5) into (4) gives 
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When a = 0, or δ = 0 and Δ = 0, which means zero growth or discount parameters equal 
to zero for both actors, the total profits for the two-period game in (6) equal the profits u1 
and U1 in (2) for the first period. The second term in each of the two brackets in (6), 
multiplied with the factor outside each bracket, express the additional profits the defender 
and attacker earn in the second period. These two terms depend on the four parameters a, 
b, B, β. Additionally, for the defender it depends on δ, and for the attacker it depends on 
Δ and t1/T1. The asset r operates proportionally outside the brackets. Differentiating (6), 
and solving the first order conditions 1/ 0u t∂ ∂ =  and 1/ 0U T∂ ∂ =  gives: 
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We confine attention to the interesting case t1 ≥ 0 and T1 ≥ 0, which occurs when the 
defender has an incentive to defend its asset in the first period. The denominators in t1 
and T1 are equivalent. The two brackets in the numerators in t1 and T1 are also equivalent, 
but oppositely squared. The rightmost bracket in the two numerators reaches zero when, 
for example, growth is large, causing the corner solution t1 = T1 = 0. Inserting a = 0 or 
δ = Δ = 0 into (7) gives: 
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Proposition 1. First period: 
1 When δ > βb(B – βb)Δ/2B2 (which is satisfied when δ > Δ/8), the defender’s 
investment t1 is inverse U formed in a so that it increases in a when a = 0, reaches a 
maximum, and decreases. It otherwise decreases directly. 
2 When Δ > B(βb – B) δ/2β2b2 (which is satisfied when Δ > δ/8), the attacker’s 
investment T1 decreases in a. It otherwise is inverse U formed. 
3 Both investments t1 and T1 equal zero when a ≥ (B + βb)2/Δβ2b2. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
When a = 0 or δ = Δ = 0, only the first period matters, which effectively means that the 
first period is the last period, which implies t1/T1 = B/βb. This corresponds to the general 
result t2/T2 = B/βb or the second period in (9). The ratio of the investments is inverse 
proportional to the ratio b/B of the inefficiencies, and inverse proportional to the usability 
for the attacker. 
Assume δ > βb(B – βb)Δ/2B2 and Δ > B(βb – B) δ/2β2b2. As a increases above zero, 
the ratio t1/T1 initially increases. The reason is that the defender seeks to defend his asset. 
He increases his investment t1 so that the asset can grow to the second period without 
suffering too much predation by the attacker. The attacker is also interested in asset 
growth, and reduces the attack T1 with the objective of launching a more substantial 
attack in the second period. The attacker shows restraint in the first period in order to 
cash in on the fruits of her restraint in the second period. He may, so to speak, farm the 
defender. As shown in the Appendix, the decrease of T1 is concave when B > 2bβ and 
a = 0, concave when 3 / 2B bβ>  and a = 1/δ = 1/Δ, and is always concave when 
a = (B + βb)2/Δβ2b2. The ratio t1/T1 increases in a, reaches a maximum, and decreases, 
and thereafter t1/T1 decreases too. The reason is that both agents find a joint interest in 
asset growth. They leave a blossoming asset or enterprise partly untouched from 
predation. The attacker reduces T1, and as T1 gets low, the defender no longer needs a 
high defence t1, and optimally reduces t1. The defender’s incentive to guard his asset is 
inverse U formed in a and thus eventually falls in the value of a because, with more 
growth, he has to defend against a greater attack in the second period. Eventually, both t1 
and T1 reach zero, which for both occur when a = (B + βb)2/Δβ2b2. This gives a corner 
solution discussed in the next section. 
The uncommon event δ < βb(B – βb)Δ/2B2 means that the defender discounts more 
than eight times more than the attacker. The defender is less interested in asset growth, 
and focuses on obtaining a good fraction of the asset in the first period through choosing 
an investment t1 that initially decreases in a. The attacker is more interested in asset 
growth and looks forward to enjoying the fruits of asset growth in the second period. The 
other uncommon event Δ > B(βb – B) δ/2β2b2 means that the attacker discounts more than 
eight times more than the defender. The attacker is less interested in asset growth, focuses 
especially on the first period, and chooses an investment T1 that initially increases in a. 
Inserting (7) into (5) gives: 
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Proposition 2. Second period: 
1 The defender’s and attacker’s investments t2 and T2 increase in a. 
2 Attack and defence always occur in the second period. A corner solution with 
t2 = T2 = 0 is never possible. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The second period is the last opportunity for the attacker to attack the asset, since the 
game ends thereafter. Consequently the attacker chooses a large attack T2, and an even 
larger attack when growth from the first to the second period is large. Naturally, the 
defender puts up a solid defence t2 to counter this attack, and an even more substantial 
defence if growth is large. He does not want to see a promising growing enterprise 
predated upon. 
If the attacker hypothetically were to choose zero investment T2 = 0 in the second 
period, she would be guaranteed zero profit in the second period. The second period 
profits in (3), and the solutions shown in (5) and (9), show how this cannot happen. 
Attack and defence may or may not occur in the first period, but always occur in the 
second period. If the defender were to choose an out-of-equilibrium unreasonably large 
second period defence t2, there are cases where the attacker’s benefit of a positive attack 
would not be worth the expenditure BT2. This can be seen from the rightmost equation in 
(3) where the second term exceeds the first term when t2 is large. She would then choose 
T2 = 0. However, when both defender and attacker choose equilibrium investments t2 and 
T2, 100% deterrence of the opponent is not optimal in the second period equilibrium 
investments. 
Inserting the first and second period investments in (7) and (9) into (2) to (4) gives the 
profits5: 
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We define ui/ti and Ui/Ti as the rates of return on investments in period i. Profits are 
interpreted as returns. In the second period, these rates are B/β and βb, respectively, as 
shown in (10). Intuitively, the defender’s rate of return increases if the attack inefficiency 
increases, or the usability for the attacker decreases, both of which are to the detriment of 
the attacker. Analogously, the attacker’s rate of return increases in the defence 
inefficiency and usability. When a = 0 or Δ = δ = 0, the first period effectively operates 
as the last period, with equivalent ratios u1/t1 = B/β, U1/T1 = βb. 
Whereas the second period investment ratio for the defender and attacker is 
t2/T2 = B/βb, the second period profit ratio is u2/U2 = B2/β3b2, which can be expressed as 
u2/U2 = (t2/T2)2/β. That is, while the ratio t2/T2 is inverse proportional to the ratio b/B of 
the inefficiencies, and inverse proportional to the usability for the attacker, the ratio u2/U2 
is inverse proportional to the square of the ratio b/B of the inefficiencies, and inverse 
proportional to the usability raised to the third power for the attacker. This demonstrates a 
magnifying effect. Consider a modest investment difference between the defender and 
attacker in the second period. This means that t2/T2 is close to one, as a result of B/βb 
being close to one, which occurs for example with similar attack and defence 
inefficiencies and usability close to one. The modest investment difference gets 
magnified into a larger profit difference because of the squaring. The winner in the 
investment contest gets a disproportionally large fraction of the profit. Furthermore, the 
defender benefits additionally if the usability is low. 
The first period profits u1 and U1 in (10) are hard to interpret. Let us exemplify these 
by inserting b = B = β = 1 into (7) and (10) which gives: 
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For this example, u1 never equals zero, and increases throughout in δa e.g., when δ = Δ. 
u1 = r when Δa > 0 because of the corner solution. In contrast, U1 equals zero when 
Δa > 4 and decreases throughout in Δa e.g., when δ = Δ. When Δa is large, the attacker 
shows restraint in the first period in order to benefit in the second period. 
Proposition 3. 
1 The defender’s total profit increases in a. 
2 The attacker’s total profit increases in a unless growth is very low and the attacker is 
burdened by a high attack inefficiency or a low usability of appropriation. The 
requirement is 3bβΔ > B(2δ – Δ) when a = 0. 
3 The defender’s and attacker’s second period profits increase in a. 
4 When b = B = β = 1, u1 never equals zero, and increases throughout in δa e.g., when 
δ = Δ, while U1 equals zero when Δa > 4 and decreases throughout in Δa e.g., when 
δ = Δ. 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
4 Conditions for neither attack nor defence in the first period 
The rightmost bracket in the two numerators in (7) reaches zero when, for example, 
growth is large, causing t1 = T1 = 0. Then the attacker does not attack, causing no need for 
the defender to defend, in the first period. Conflict is entirely eliminated in the first 
period. The defender is left to enjoy his asset entirely undisturbed in the first period. Such 
lack of investment in the first period corresponds to a corner solution where t1 = T1 = 0. 
The defender’s discount parameter δ plays no role in the rightmost bracket in the two 
numerators in (7), while the attacker’s discount parameter Δ does play a role. Hence the 
attacker’s time preference crucially determines whether attack and thus defence occur in 
the first period, though a total of five parameters play a role. 
Let us analyse the conditions on the five parameters a, Δ, b, B, β that ensure neither 
attack nor defence in the first period, t1 = T1 = 0. This means that the defender retains his 
entire asset after the first period. In the second period the contest is thus over ar rather 
than over art1/(t1 + T1). Of the five parameters, growth a affects both defender and 
attacker directly. The defence inefficiency b is intrinsically linked to the defender. The 
attack inefficiency B, usability β, and discount parameter Δ are intrinsically linked to the 
attacker. 
Proposition 4. When (B + βb)2 – Δaβ2b2 < 0, neither attack nor defence occur in the first 
period, t1 = T1 = 0. 
Proof. Follows from requiring t1 < 0 or T1 < 0 (equivalent requirements) in (7), which 
prevents an attack and does not necessitate a defence in the first period. 
The inequality in Proposition 4 contains five parameters which we consider in turn. First, 
we rewrite the inequality as a > (B + βb)2/Δβ2b2, which means that when growth is large, 
t1 = T1 = 0. Parameter a is the only parameter among the five parameters which can be 
adjusted so that the inequality is satisfied regardless of the other four parameters. It is 
always possible to specify sufficiently large growth that prevents an attack in the first 
period, which causes no need for defence in the first period. When this is the case, the 
moral is: Don’t disturb a growing asset or enterprise. Leave it to prosper without 
interference.6 Wait with the attack until another day, when growth slows down, or the 
enterprise is over the top. The defender and attacker develop a tacit or not so tacit truce, 
common understanding, mutual coordination, and joint common interest, by which peace, 
tranquility, and no conflict occur in the first period. The defender is left to enjoy his 
entire asset worth r in the first period, and the attacker is pleased earning zero profit in 
the first period. The attacker’s reasoning is that attack on another day, in the future, may 
generate an even larger profit due to growth of the asset through time. Although an attack 
on the asset today may generate a modest instantaneous profit, it has the disadvantage 
that the growth of the asset gets hampered. An attack today stifles the growth of the asset 
since less of it is left to grow. Hampering such long term growth possibilities may 
severely reduce the attacker’s long term profit opportunities. If the condition in 
Proposition 1 is met, the attacker thus chooses to show restraint in the first period, in 
order to gain even further profit in the second period. 
To exemplify the growth requirement, assume first equal defence and attack 
inefficiencies b = B and that β = Δ = 1 which implies a > 4. This means that the asset 
must be quadrupled from the first to the second period to prevent an attack altogether in 
the first period. Second, assume a five-fold superiority of attack over defence expressed 
such that the attack inefficiency is 1/5 of the defence inefficiency, that is B = b/5, and that 
β = δ = 1. This implies a > 1.44. Hence the asset must grow with at least 44% to deter an 
attack in the first period. Third, assume 50% usability for the attacker expressed as 
β = 0.5, and that b = B and Δ = 1. This implies a > 9. Finally, assume 50% attacker 
discounting, Δ = 0.5, and that b = B and β = 1, which implies a > 8. This exemplification 
becomes clearer as we proceed to the next parameters. 
Second, we rewrite the inequality as Δ > (B + βb)2/aβ2b2, which means that when the 
attacker’s discount parameter Δ is large, t1 = T1 = 0. Both large growth and a large 
attacker discount parameter cause higher significance for the second period. When the 
second period is sufficiently significant for the attacker, the attacker refrains from 
attacking in the first period, as discussed above. High growth can always compensate for 
a low attacker discount parameter, even when the discount parameter is arbitrarily close 
to zero, but not when it equals zero which renders the second period irrelevant for the 
attacker. Conversely, although a high discount parameter can compensate for low growth, 
the growth requirement a > [(B + βb)/βb]2 has to be met. When this requirement is not 
satisfied, even a discount parameter Δ = 1 is not sufficient to prevent an attack in the first 
period. As one example, at the limit when the attack inefficiency approaches zero, 
B → 0, which means a virtually costless attack for the attacker, the requirement becomes 
a > 1, which means that the asset must grow at least arbitrarily little so that Δ = 1 can 
deter an attack in the first period. Second, when b = B and β = 1, the requirement 
becomes a > 4. 
Observe in (7) how Δa and δa are both multiplicatively present twice in t1 and T1. The 
same is the case for u1, U1, u, U in (10). There is no individual occurrence of a or Δ or δ. 
This shows the linkage between growth and discounting, so that one can compensate for 
the other. But there is also a difference. Growth in (3) operates only on the asset, and 
neither on the defence investment expenditure bt2 nor on the attack investment 
expenditure BT2 in the second period. In contrast, discounting δ and Δ in (4) operate on 
the entire second period profits, u2 and U2 respectively, which means on both the asset 
and the expenditures. Consequently, although Δa occurs once and δa occurs twice in the 
second period variables t2, T2, u2, U2 in (9) and (10), growth a additionally occurs 
individually once and proportionally on each of these four variables. 
Third, we rewrite the inequality as ( )/ 1 ,b B aβ⎡ ⎤> Δ −⎣ ⎦  which means that when the
defence inefficiency is large, t1 = T1 = 0. A large defence inefficiency means that it is 
costly for the defender to defend himself. The attacker can easily inject a serious blow to 
the detriment of the defender in both the first period and the second period. She chooses 
to do so in the second period to take advantage of the growth of the asset. The growth 
requirement is Δa > 1. More specifically, without attacker discounting, Δ = 1, growth 
must be larger than one, a > 1, for there to be a large b that ensures t1 = T1 = 0. With 
discounting 0 < Δ < 1, growth must be sufficiently above one, a > 1/Δ, so that a large b 
ensures t1 = T1 = 0. This means that attacker discounting must be compensated by high 
growth in order to prevent an attack in the first period. With maximum attacker 
discounting, Δ = 0, or zero growth, a = 0, the second period becomes irrelevant. Then 
even an arbitrarily large defence inefficiency does not prevent an attack in the first 
period. In other words, when b is large and Δa > 1, the defender enjoys his entire asset in 
the first period, but is not able to set up a good defence and is severely exploited by the 
attacker in the second period. 
Fourth, we rewrite the inequality as ( )1 ,B b aβ< Δ −  which means that when the
attack inefficiency is low, t1 = T1 = 0. A low attack inefficiency has an impact similar to 
that of a high defence inefficiency. The attacker is given an advantage in both cases. 
When Δa > 1, the attacker uses the advantage in the second period, leaving the asset 
untouched for growth in the first period. 
Fifth, we rewrite the inequality as ( )/ 1 ,B b aβ ⎡ ⎤> Δ −⎣ ⎦  which means that when the
usability β of appropriation for the attacker is large, t1 = T1 = 0. A high usability β also 
gives an advantage to the attacker since much of the appropriated asset can then be 
utilised by the attacker. As for the third and fourth cases, the attacker uses the advantage 
in the second period so that the asset can grow from the first to the second period. 
Conversely, when β is low, although the defender may lose a significant fraction of his 
asset, the attacker can not utilise a significant part of the fraction of the asset that is 
appropriated. Hence even when Δa > 1, the attacker can not obtain sufficient advantage 
from the substantial asset growth to confine the attack to the second period. 
Consequently, the attacker attacks also in the first period. Although the usability of 
appropriation is low in both periods, spreading the attack over both periods causes larger 
profit for the attacker than confining the attack to the second period. 
Let us finally solve for the corner solution when t1 = T1 = 0. With neither attack nor 
defence in the first period, the defender keeps his entire asset, and the attacker earns zero 
profit. This gives the profits u1 = r and U1 = 0 in the first period. Using (3) and (4), the 
total profits are: 
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
,t Tu r ar bt U ar BT
t T t T
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − = Δ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
δ β  (12)
Differentiating (1), solving the first order conditions 2/ 0u t∂ ∂ =  and 2/ 0U T∂ ∂ = , and 
inserting into (3) and (4) gives: 
3 2
2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2, , , , ,( )
bt Bt b uBart T u U bT u r u U U
BB b B
= = = = = = + = Δ+
β ββ β δββ  (13) 
5 Simulations 
This section illustrates the earlier results with simulations. Figure 1 sets Δ = δ = b = B = β 
= r = 1 and plots the investments t1, T1, t2, T2 and profits u1, U1, u2, U2, u, U as functions 
of growth a. t1 is inverse U formed, T1 decreases, and t2 = T2 increase. Division with 3, 
and the other divisions below, is for scaling purposes. All the profits increase except U1 
which decreases, in accordance with (10). The attacker accepts reduced profit in the first 
period in order to enjoy asset growth and increased profit in the second period. Neither 
attack nor defence occur when a > 4. 
Figure 2 plots as a function of Δ = δ and sets a = 6. The other parameters are as in 
Figure 1. Figure 2 is qualitatively similar to Figure 1. Neither attack nor defence occur 
when Δ = δ > 2/3. 
Figure 3 plots as a function of b and sets a = 2. The other parameters are as in 
Figure 1. The defender’s first and second period investments t1 and t2 decrease in the 
defence inefficiency. Neither attack nor defence occur when ( )1/ 2 1 .b > −  As b
increases and reaches this value, the attacker first increases and thereafter decreases the 
first period attack T1 toward zero in order to benefit in the second period. This causes the 
first period profit u1, and also the total profit u, for the defender to be U formed. 
However, the second period profit for the defender decreases, while the second period 
profit U2 and total profit U for the attacker increase. 
Figure 4 plots as a function of β and sets a = 2. The other parameters are as in 
Figure 1. Neither attack nor defence occur when 2 1.B < −  The interpretation is 
analogous to that of Figure 3. 
Figure 5 plots as a function of β and sets a = 2 and B = 1/4. The other parameters are 
as in Figure 1. Neither attack nor defence occur when ( )1/ 2 2 1 .β ⎡ ⎤> −⎣ ⎦  Increasing the
usability β benefits the attacker, as does increasing the defence inefficiency b. Hence 
Figure 5 has some characteristics similar to Figure 3. 
Figure 1 (a) Investments t1, T1, t2, T2 as functions of growth α (b) profits u1, U1, u2, U2, u, U as 
functions of growth α (see online version for colours) 
(a) 
(b) 
  
Figure 2 (a) Investments t1, T1, t2, T2 as functions of discounting Δ = δ (b) profits u1, U1, u2, U2, 
u, U as functions of discounting Δ = δ (see online version for colours) 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 3 (a) Investments t1, T1, t2, T2 as functions of the defence inefficiency b (b) profits u1, U1, 
u2, U2, u, U as functions of the defence inefficiency b (see online version for colours) 
(a) 
(b) 
 Figure 4 (a) Investments t1, T1, t2, T2 as functions of the attack inefficiency B (b) profits u1, U1, 
u2, U2, u, U as functions of the attack inefficiency B (see online version for colours) 
(a) 
(b) 
Figure 5 (a) Investments t1, T1, t2, T2 as functions of the usability β (b) profits u1, U1, u2, U2, u, U 
as functions of the usability β (see online version for colours) 
(a) 
(b) 
6 Conclusions 
The article succeeds in contributing to the dynamic conflict literature which is currently 
small due to analytical intractability. There is a hope that different approaches may 
change these states of affairs. A defender possesses an asset. An attacker chooses optimal 
attacks in each of two periods. The defender chooses optimal defences. A contest success 
function determines the relative fractions obtained by each actor. The defender’s fraction 
may grow from the first to the second period. The attacker’s fraction is consumed without 
growth. 
As growth increases, the attacker becomes increasingly interested in the potentially 
large asset that can be appropriated in the second period. The attacker shows restraint in 
the first period in order to cash in on the fruits of her restraint in the second period. She 
may, so to speak, farm the defender. For sufficiently high growth, where four other 
parameters also play a role, neither attack nor defence occur in the first period. First 
period conflict is completely eliminated, the defender keeps his entire asset, the attacker 
gets nothing, and they are both pleased with the situation. This result is quite astonishing. 
Conflict is simply eliminated by ensuring asset growth. As an example, with equal 
defence and attack inefficiencies, 100% usability of appropriation, and a discount 
parameter one for the attacker, the asset must be quadrupled from the first to the second 
period to prevent an attack altogether in the first period. 
When the defender’s discount parameter is at least 1/8 of the attacker’s discount 
parameter, the defender’s first period investment is inverse U formed in growth and 
eventually decreases to zero. The defender’s incentive to guard his asset eventually falls 
with growth because, with more growth, he has to defend against a greater attack in the 
second period. When the attacker’s discount parameter is at least 1/8 of the defender’s 
discount parameter, the attacker’s first period investment decreases and reaches zero for 
the same value. In the second period both actors’ investments increase in growth. Attack 
and defence always occur in the second period. Only if the defender were to choose an 
out-of-equilibrium unreasonably large second period defence, is it possible that the 
attacker’s benefit of a positive attack would not be worth the expenditure. The second 
period is the last opportunity for the attacker to attack the asset. This gives substantial 
conflict in the second period, which can be alleviated by extending the game to three 
periods. The attacker can be deterred by demonstrating substantial growth into future 
periods. 
The defender’s total profit increases in growth. The attacker’s total profit increases in 
growth unless growth is very low and the attacker is burdened by a high attack 
inefficiency or a low usability of appropriation. In the second period, or in the first period 
with either zero growth or discount parameters equal to zero for both actors, the ratio of 
the investments for the defender and attacker is inverse proportional to the ratio of the 
inefficiencies of defence and attack, and inverse proportional to the usability of 
appropriation for the attacker. 
The growth requirement to eliminate conflict in the first period does not depend on 
the defender’s discount parameter, but it depends on four other parameters, and can also 
be rewritten in terms of these. First, a first period attack is prevented if the attacker’s 
discount parameter is large, and growth is above a certain value. Second, a first period 
attack is prevented if the defence inefficiency is large, and the product of growth and the 
discount parameter is above one. Then it is costly for the defender to defend himself. The 
attacker can easily inject a serious blow to the detriment of the defender in both periods. 
She chooses to do so in the second period to take advantage of asset growth. Third, a first 
period attack is prevented if the attack inefficiency is low, and the product of growth and 
the discount parameter is above one. A low attack inefficiency has an impact similar to 
that of a high defence inefficiency. The attacker is given an advantage in both cases. 
Fourth, a first period attack is prevented if the usability of appropriation is large, and the 
product of growth and the discount parameter is above one. A high usability also gives an 
advantage to the attacker since much of the appropriated asset can then be utilised by the 
attacker. The attacker uses the advantage in the second period so that the asset can grow 
from the first to the second period. 
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Notes 
1 The military conflict literature, without production, is strongly dynamic and also stochastic. It 
focuses on force sizes through time, distinguishes between classical and guerrilla war, and 
there may be reinforcement. 
2 Defining V* as “the set of individually rational payoffs, “the Folk Theorem states: “For any 
(v1, …, vn)∈V*, if players discount the future sufficiently little, there exists a Nash equilibrium 
of the infinitely repeated game where, for all i, player i’s average payoff is vi” [Fudenberg and 
Maskin, (1986), p.537]. 
3 b can also be interpreted as the unit cost of defence investment, where ti is generally 
continuous. 
4 An alternative analysis may for example assume that the attacker is risk seeking while the 
defender is risk averse. Assuming risk neutrality simplifies the analysis. Much of the 
economic conflict literature related to production, appropriation, defence, and rent seeking 
assumes risk neutrality. See Skaperdas (1991) for an exception. 
5 All calculations in this article are made using the Mathematica software package 
(http://www.wolfram.com). 
6 Partly related notions are ‘don’t change a winning team’ and ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. 
Appendix 
Proof of propositions 
Proof of Proposition 1 
1 Differentiating t1 in (7) with respect to a and inserting a = 0 gives: 
( ) ( ) ( )22 21
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(A1) 
which is positive when 2( ) / 2b B b Bδ β β> − Δ , which is satisfied when δ > Δ/8  
(the latter inequality is a sufficient condition for the former inequality). Inserting 
a = 1/δ = 1/Δ and 2 2 2( ) /a B b bβ δβ= +  into 1 /t a∂ ∂  gives 
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which are positive and negative, respectively. Hence when δ > Δ/8, t1 increases to a 
maximum, and decreases to zero. Maximum t1 occurs when 
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and equals 
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2 Differentiating T1 in (7) with respect to a and inserting a = 0 gives: 
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which is negative when 2 2( ) / 2 ,B b B bβ δ βΔ > −  which is satisfied when Δ > δ/8. 
Inserting a = 1/δ = 1/Δ and 2 2 2( ) /a B b bβ δβ= +  into 1 /T a∂ ∂  gives: 
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which specify decrease when Δ > δ/8. The second derivative is 
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which is concave when B > 2bβ and a = 0, and is concave for a more lenient requirements 
as a increases. For a = 1/Δ and 2 2 2( ) /a B b bβ β= + Δ , the concavity requirements are: 
2 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2
1
2 2 2 2 2 41
2 ( ) ( ) ( ( ) 3 ) 30 when 
(3 3 ( ))a
T br B b B b B b B b
a B bB b B
β βδ β δ β βδβ β δ= Δ
⎛ ⎞∂ + Δ + Δ + Δ − Δ Δ= > >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + Δ∂ Δ + Δ + + Δ⎝ ⎠
(A10) 
22 2
2 7 8 3
1
2 2 4 2 2 2( )
2 0
( ) ( )B ba
b
T b r
a B B b B bβ
β
β
β δ β+= Δ
⎛ ⎞∂ Δ= >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ + + Δ⎝ ⎠
(A11)
3 Follows from (7). 
Proof of Proposition 2 
1 Differentiating t2 in (9) with respect to a gives: 
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To show that 2 / 0,t a∂ ∂ >  observe that the denominator is positive because of the 
quadration. To show that the numerator is positive, we set it equal to zero and solve with 
respect to a which gives two solutions. One solution is negative, and the other equals: 
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We proceed to show that this value of a is always larger than 2 2 2( ) / ,B b bβ β+ Δ  which 
according to Proposition 1 gives the corner solution t1 = T1 = 0, which implies that a in 
(A13) never applies, which implies 2 / 0.t a∂ ∂ >  The requirement: 
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simplifies to: 
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Squaring both sides gives: 
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A stronger requirement is: 
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where we have subtracted 1 on the LHS. When the stronger requirement is satisfied, the 
weaker requirement is also always satisfied. Simplifying (A17) gives: 
2 2 3 3 32 0Bb B bβ δ βΔ + + Δ > (A18)
which is always satisfied. 
2 The denominator in (9) is positive since it is squared, and the numerator is positive. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
1 Differentiating u in (10) with respect to a gives: 
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To show that the numerator is positive, we set it equal to zero and solve with respect to a 
which gives three solutions. Two solutions are negative (and equivalent), and the third 
equals: 
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We proceed to show that this value of a is always larger than 2 2 2( ) / ,B b bβ β+ Δ  which 
according to Proposition 1 gives the corner solution t1 = T1 = 0, which implies that a in 
(A20) never applies. The requirement is: 
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A stronger requirement is: 
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which is always satisfied. To show that the denominator is positive, we set it equal to 
zero and solve with respect to a which gives: 
3
3 3 3
( )B b βa
b β B δ
+= Δ − (A24)
We proceed to show that this value of a is always larger than 2 2 2( ) / ,B b bβ β+ Δ  which 
has the same implications as above. The requirement is: 
3 2
3 3 3 2 2
( ) ( )B b β B b β
b β B δ b β
+ +>Δ − Δ (A25)
A stronger requirement is: 
3 2
3 3 2 2
( ) ( )B b β B b β
b β b β
+ +>Δ Δ (A26)
which simplifies to 
1B b β
b β
+ > (A27)
which is always satisfied. 
2 Differentiating U in (10) with respect to a and inserting three values of a gives: 
2 2 3
5
0
(3 (2 )) 0 when 3 (2 )
( )a
U b B r β b β B δ b β B δ
a B b β=
∂ Δ − − Δ⎛ ⎞ = > Δ > − Δ⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠  (A28) 
2 3 6 3 4 2 2 2 2
1
2 4 3 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 2
4 2 2 2 3 2
2 2 2 3
( ( 3 ( 3 3 )
   ( 6 18 26 15 )
   ( ) ( 5 7 ) )) / (( )
    × (3 3 ( )) )
a
U b rβ B δ B B bBβ b β δ
a
B B bB β b B β b Bβ b β δ
B bβ B bBβ b β B bβ
bBβ b β B δ
= Δ
∂⎛ ⎞ = Δ + + + Δ⎜ ⎟∂⎝ ⎠
+ + + + + Δ
+ + + + Δ +
Δ + Δ + + Δ 0>
(A29)
2
2 2
2 3
2( )
0
( )B b βa
b β
U b r β
a B b β+= Δ
∂ Δ⎛ ⎞ = >⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠ (A30)
3 Follows from the proof of Proposition 2 (1) since u2 = Bt2/β, U2 = βbT2. 
4 Follows from (13). 
